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Contemporary pension systems in developed countries reﬂect economic,
social, and political conditions in the 1930s and the ﬁrst decades after
World War II. Recently, new socioeconomic conditions have created both
rationales and political forces for revisions of existing pension systems.
Changes in demography, real wage growth, and real interest rates are obvi-
ous examples. Increased heterogeneity and instability of the family, higher
labor force participation by women, increased diversity of individual life
cycles, greater international mobility of labor and capital, and ambitions
to encourage individual responsibility also have important implications for
pension systems. Moreover, some socioeconomic changes have been in-
duced by the pension system itself via (endogenous) behavioral adjust-
ments of individuals, with feedback eﬀects on the pension system.
When discussing these issues, it is useful to set up a more elaborate
classiﬁcation of pension systems than the usual distinction between de-
ﬁned beneﬁt (DB) and deﬁned contribution (DC) systems. The choice of
an appropriate taxonomy depends, of course, on the issues to be raised.
One question on which this paper focuses concerns the consequences of
socioeconomic changes for the intergenerational distribution of income
and the sharing of income risk among generations. The distinction be-
tween pension systems with exogenous and endogenous contribution rates
(tax rates) then becomes crucial. However, when one is analyzing socio-
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19economic changes that are induced by the pension arrangements them-
selves, other distinguishing features of pension systems must be taken into
account. These include the degree to which the systems are pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) and funded, respectively; whether the systems have strong links
between contributions and beneﬁts with individual accounts; and whether
pension payments are lump sum, a fraction of previous individual earnings
or contributions, or a fraction of current average earnings.
Against this background, six generic pension systems are classiﬁed in
section 1.1. Each system can be varied considerably, both by incorporating
elements from other systems and by introducing restrictions on contribu-
tions or beneﬁts. Section 1.2 turns to the consequences, in the context of
each system, of socioeconomic changes for the intergenerational distribu-
tion of income, risk sharing, and macroeconomic balance. Endogenous
behavioral adjustments in response to welfare-state arrangements, in par-
ticular via disincentive eﬀects on work and saving, are also introduced.
Such eﬀects are discussed in more detail in subsequent sections, which
examine alternative pension reforms aimed at mitigating disincentives. A
few of these reforms are “marginal” in the sense that the existing pension
system is modiﬁed (section 1.3). Such reforms include both ad hoc policy
measures and various automatic adjustment mechanisms. Two radical re-
forms are discussed in section 1.4, namely, a shift to either a quasi-
actuarial system characterized by a strong link between contributions and
beneﬁts, or to a fully funded pension system with a capital-market rate of
return on the contributions. Adjustments of various pension systems to
increased heterogeneity of individuals and households are considered in
section 1.5, and section 1.6 concludes.
1.1 Classiﬁcation of Pension Systems
I begin by considering two pension systems with exogenous contribution
rates and, hence, endogenous pension beneﬁts: (1) a ﬁxed-fee PAYGO sys-
tem with budget balance and (2) a fully funded system with individual
accounts and a capital-market return on the pension contributions. I then
turn to four PAYGO systems with ﬁxed beneﬁt rules and hence en-
dogenouscontributionrates:(3)alump-sumbeneﬁtsystem,(4)anearnings-
based system, (5) a contribution-based system, and (6) a ﬁxed (intergener-
ational) income-ratio system. I use the following notations:
payroll tax rate
y  average labor income
N  number of employed individuals (workers)
R  number of retired individuals
B  ﬁxed (lump-sum) pension beneﬁt per person
Gt(yt Nt)/(yt–1 Nt–1)rate of growth factor for labor income (tax base)
20 Assar Lindbecki  real interest rate on ﬁnancial markets
I  1  i  real interest-rate factor
wj  real wage rate of individual j
hj  hours of work of individual j
I assume two overlapping generations, each living for two periods. For
some purposes, however, it is important to divide each of these periods
into several subperiods (“years”). The following schematic description of
revenues and expenditures of various pension systems should be self-
explanatory. The revenues of the pension system are denoted below, and
the expenditures above the horizontal lines.
1.1.1 Exogenous Contribution Rate
System No. 1: Fixed-Fee System
In this pension system, there is a ﬁxed contribution rate t in each pe-
riod, although the rate may vary from period to period. Because the sys-
tem is PAYGO, aggregate pension beneﬁts in period t are determined by
the revenues of the system in the same period, tytNt. Hence, the budget
is balanced by deﬁnition.
(t  1) (t)( t  1)
tytNt Expenditures   
Revenues t1yt1Nt1
t1yt1Nt1   
yytNt
















This factor is Gt if Rt  Nt–1 and t  t–1.
System No. 2: Actuarially Fair, Fully Funded System
As in the ﬁxed-fee system, the contribution rate  is exogenous in each
period and the pension beneﬁt is endogenous. The return on the individu-
al’s forced saving is determined by the return in capital markets, i. There
is intertemporal budget balance for each cohort.
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It1yt1Nt1   
t1yt1Nt1
ItytNt   
yytNt
As is well known, a compulsory, fully funded pension system will inﬂuence
the consumption of the individual only if he or she is liquidity constrained
or unwilling to borrow or to reduce saving, and hence unable to oﬀset
government-induced reallocations of his or her cash ﬂow. The return fac-
tor is INt–1/Rt.
1.1.2 Endogenous Contribution Rate
System No. 3: Lump-Sum Beneﬁt System
This pension system provides the individual with an exogenously given
basic pension, while the contribution rate  is endogenously determined in
each period to ensure balance in the budget of the pension system.
B  Rt   
t1yt1Nt1
B  Rt1   
yytNt
The balanced budget requirement is
BR yN tt t t =  .

















This factor is Gt if Rt  Nt–1 and t  t–1. B/yt–1 is the replacement rate,
which is inversely proportional to the individual’s previous income.







where B/yt  the intergenerational income ratio and Rt/Nt the depen-
dency ratio.
22 Assar Lindbeck2. The return is the same as in a lump-sum beneﬁt system if B/yt1.
System No. 4: Earnings-Based System
In this system, the pension of an individual is determined as a ﬁxed
fraction (replacement rate)  of his or her previous earnings.
yt1Rt   
t1yt1Nt1
ytRt1   
tytNt
The balanced budget requirement is
yt1RttytNt.
The implicit return factor is2
(5)
yt  1















System No. 5: Contribution-Based System
The pension in this system is a ﬁxed fraction, 	, of contributions pre-
viously paid by the individual. Such a system is sometimes called a notional
deﬁned contribution (NDC) system.
	t1yt1Rt   
t1yt1Nt1
	  wt  Rt1   
tytNt
The balanced budget requirement is
	t1yt1Rt  tytNt .
The implicit return factor is
Pensions and Contemporary Socioeconomic Change 233. An alternative version of this pension system could be a ﬁxed after-tax income ratio
between generations, with the pension set to 
(1  t)yt. The implicit return factor is now

(1  t)yt/(t1yt1), but with a balanced budget the return will be identical to the case in
the text: tNtyt/(t1Rtyt1)  Gt if Rt  Nt1 and t  t1. The endogenous t required for a











This factor is Gt if Rt  Nt–1 and t  t–1.













System No. 6: Fixed Intergenerational Income-Ratio System
In this system, the pension of an individual is a ﬁxed fraction, 
,o ft h e
average earnings of contemporary workers (i.e., the system is based on an
intergenerational income distribution target).

ytRt   
t1yt1Nt1

yt1Rt1   
tytNt
The balanced budget requirement is

ytRt  tytNt.






This factor is Gt if Rt  Nt–1 and t  t–1.










To summarize, in a ﬁxed-fee PAYGO system, the (endogenous) pension
beneﬁt to a representative pensioner must fall in proportion to a drop in
average earnings of contemporary workers (yt) and in the number of work-
ers (Nt) relative to the number of pensioners (Rt); see equation (1). In
lump-sum beneﬁt, earnings-based, and contribution-based systems, the
(endogenous) contribution rate must be raised in proportion to similar
changes in the same variables; see equations (4), (6), and (8). In a ﬁxed
income-ratio system, the (endogenous) contribution rate must be raised in
proportion to a fall in the number of workers relative to the number of
24 Assar Lindbeckretirees; see equation (10). In actuarially fair systems, neither the contribu-
tion rate nor the pension beneﬁt is directly related to the number of pen-
sioners or the aggregate earnings of workers.
Observe that the well-known result that the rate of return in a PAYGO
pension system equals the growth rate of the wage sum (Gt – 1) holds only
if t  t–1 and Rt  Nt–1. The intuition is obvious. So long as the contribu-
tion rate is raised over time (t  t–1), the return for contemporary pen-
sioners is higher than Gt – 1; see equations above for the return factor. If
some individuals die before retirement age (so that Rt  Nt–1), those who
live long enough to receive pensions will get a higher return Gt –1o n
previously paid contributions.4
To highlight the incentive structure for individuals in diﬀerent pension




t–1. Suppose that the individual increases the number of hours he or
she works, hj
t–1, or raises his or her wage, wj
t–1, by his or her own eﬀort
(including training). Both the individual’s contributions and his or her pen-
sion beneﬁts will then increase in the same proportion in a contribution-
based system with individual (notional) accounts (i.e., an NDC system). I
will call such a system quasi-actuarial, because there is a close link between
the contributions paid earlier by the individual and the beneﬁt that he or
she subsequently receives. (The term quasi refers to the fact that, in gen-
eral, the return diﬀers from the return in ﬁnancial markets.) In ﬁxed-fee,
ﬁxed income-ratio, and lump-sum beneﬁt systems, the individual pension
depends only on aggregate contributions and earnings, not on the individu-
al’s own contributions or earnings. Thus, when the individual changes the
number of hours he or she works (hj
t–1) or inﬂuences his or her wage (wj
t–1),
there is no eﬀect whatsoever on the individual’s own pension.
The distinction between earnings-based and contribution-based systems
is not brought out in the two-period framework above. To highlight this
distinction, we must partition the period of work into a number of subperi-
ods (at least two). In this case, only if the contribution rate  is constant
over time will the implicit return be the same in both systems (assuming
the calibration 	  t–1
5).
4. Both pension systems with exogenous contribution rates (systems no. 1 and 2) and
contribution-based system (system no. 5) with endogenous contribution rates, could possibly
be called deﬁned contribution (DC) systems. The remaining systems discussed above would
then be called deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) systems. Some authors, however, reserve the term DC
system for actuarially fair, fully funded systems with individual accounts, while identifying a
DB system as one in which pensions are tied to previous earnings (with lump-sum pensions
regarded as a special case). The latter terminology is used, for instance, by Diamond (2001)
and Thomson (1998).
5. Assume that the individual works in two periods and is retired in a third period. Retired
individuals are then supported by two subsequent generations: one engaged in its second
period of work and the other in its ﬁrst period of work. Earnings of workers in periods t 
2, t  1, and t are yt2, yt1,a n dyt, respectively. The oldest generation, which starts work in
period t  2, consists of Nt2 workers; the two subsequent generations, which start work in
Pensions and Contemporary Socioeconomic Change 25periods t  1a n dt, respectively, consist of Nt1 and Nt workers. In an earnings-based system,
the implicit return factor is now (yt2  yt1)/(t2yt2  t1yt1), whereas in a contribution-
based system it is 	.I ft2  t1  t, the return is the same in both systems if 	  t1.T h e
same condition ensures that the endogenous contribution rate is the same in both systems.
6. For formal general equilibrium analysis of pension systems, see Diamond (1977) and
Bohn (1999).
1.2 Eﬀects of Socioeconomic Changes
Let us begin by looking at the eﬀects of four types of socioeconomic
change on the distribution of income between pensioners and workers, and
hence on the risk-sharing properties of diﬀerent pension systems: (1) a
reduction in the number of workers (Nt); (2) lower average labor income
(yt) or a slower rate of increase in labor income (yt/yt–1); (3) a greater num-
ber of retired individuals (Rt); and (4) lower interest rates (i).
I begin with the direct impact on the income of workers and pensioners,
that is, the ceteris paribus eﬀect on income of a change in a socioeconomic
variable, with given rules concerning beneﬁts and fees, and with constant
values for the other variables. Because the exposition is not based on a
formal general equilibrium model, indirect eﬀects (e.g., on product prices,
wages, and asset prices) are treated heuristically.6 A useful starting point
then is to examine the consequences of various disturbances for the macro-
economic balance between aggregate demand and supply of output and
ﬁnancial assets. In this way, we are reminded of the fact that the macroeco-
nomic costs of providing pensions for the elderly consist of the elderly’s
increased consumption, which reduces resources available for younger
generations.
1.2.1 Reduced Number of Workers
An actual or expected fall in the number of workers (reduced Nt)f o ra
prolonged period is one important factor behind recent concerns about
the viability of existing pension systems. On a high level of abstraction the
consequences are rather similar, regardless of whether such a decline is the
result of emigration or of a fall (in the past) in the birth rate.
Under ﬁxed-fee pension systems, pensioners must bear the entire (di-
rect) burden of adjusting to such a change because the aggregate amount
of pension beneﬁts is constrained by the exogenously given contribution
rate times the tax base. Disposable income of individual workers is un-
aﬀected. The beneﬁt received by the average pensioner, (tytNt)/Rt,a n d
the implicit rate of return on previous contributions, (Nt/Rt)(yt/yt–1), are
both reduced in proportion to the fall in Nt. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that the aggregate consumption of pensioners will fall in (about)
the same proportion. Because there is no reason that individual workers
would change their consumption, the aggregate consumption of workers
would also be expected to fall in that proportion. If aggregate output hap-
26 Assar Lindbeck7. The derivative of ln t with respect to ln Nt is 1.
8. If the same demographic change occurred simultaneously in other countries, pensioners
would also be exposed to lower asset prices in small open economies with fully integrated
international capital markets.
pens to decrease by the same percent as employment, there would be no
disturbance to the macroeconomic balance.
In all of the other PAYGO systems mentioned above, workers have to
bear the entire (direct) burden of adjustment since fewer workers have to
ﬁnance the same (ﬁxed or predetermined) aggregate pension payments as
before. Neglecting conceivable consequences for aggregate labor supply
(i.e., assuming the income and substitution eﬀects on labor supply approxi-
mately cancel), t must be raised in proportion to the fall in the number of
active individuals in order to balance the pension budget; see equations
(4), (6), (8), and (10).7 Workers’ aggregate consumption tends to decrease
as a result of both the fall in the number of workers and the reduction in
after-tax income of each individual worker. Thus, if aggregate output
(again) happens to decline in proportion to the reduction in the number
of workers, then aggregate demand is likely to fall more than aggregate
supply. If so, there will be macroeconomic scope for reduced taxes or in-
creased government spending (or both).
Clearly, there is no (direct) risk sharing in any of the PAYGO systems
listed above in response to a fall in the number of workers.
The consequences for various pension systems are about the same if
employment falls as a result of increased structural unemployment. In this
case, however, the government would be in a worse ﬁnancial position due
to higher expenditures for unemployment beneﬁts. It is also worth noting
that a rise in structural unemployment may to some extent be caused by
the pension system itself because payroll taxes tend to raise labor costs for
workers who are exposed to minimum wages (via legislation or collective
bargaining).
In the context of an actuarially fair (fully funded) pension system, by
contrast, the income of both individual pensioners and individual workers
will be unaﬀected. After a fall in Nt,b o t hh a v es u ﬃcient income to con-
tinue consuming as much as before—as long as indirect eﬀects are ne-
glected. There may be indirect eﬀects, however. When pensioners begin
unloading ﬁnancial assets, there are fewer potential buyers of these assets
than before due to the fall in the cohort size of workers. As a result, asset
prices would fall and interest rates rise, except in the special case of a
small open economy with capital markets that are completely integrated
internationally.8 By this indirect route, even under an actuarially fair pen-
sion system, pensioners may suﬀer from a fall in the number of workers.
This argument assumes, of course, that asset holders do not rationally an-
ticipate future changes in the demand for and supply of assets in connec-
tion with future demographic change. Moreover, because workers may also
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hold ﬁnancial assets, some risk sharing with workers will take place via
this indirect route (i.e., via falling asset prices).
Except for the case of a very large decline in asset prices when pension-
ers unload their securities, aggregate demand is likely to fall less than ag-
gregate output in a society with an actuarially fair, funded pension system.
If so, there would be excess domestic demand for goods and services, with
increased inﬂation or deterioration of the current account of the balance
of payments, or both. If pensions are not fully indexed to inﬂation (and
they usually are not in fully funded systems), retirees will have to accept
further downward adjustment of their per capita consumption. Pensioners
may also be harmed by government attempts to combat the current ac-
count deﬁcit with policy measures designed to reduce domestic aggregate
demand. After all, the size of the current account of the balance of pay-
ment is often a policy target of the government—for good or bad reasons.
Determining the proportion of the reduction in consumption of workers
and pensioners would require a quantitative general equilibrium model,
which is outside the scope of this paper. In any event, a main point here is
that even under an actuarially fair pension system, pensions may not be
fully protected against the consequences of a drop in the number of work-
ers—due to the eventuality of falling asset prices, to a deterioration in the
current account of the balance of payments, and (without price indexation
of asset return) to higher inﬂation.9
1.2.2 Reduced Labor Income Growth
The slowdown in the rate of growth of average labor income (a fall in
yt/yt–1) since the early 1970s is another factor underlying today’s concern
about pension systems. This development might not be entirely regarded
as an exogenous shock from the point of view of the pension system. To
some extent, the slowdown may have been induced by labor market distor-
tions due to marginal tax wedges associated with payroll taxes, resulting
in negative substitution eﬀects on both hours of work hj and real wages wj
(the latter because of disincentives on investment in human capital and on
work intensity).
In the context of a PAYGO pension system, the direct distributional
eﬀects are rather similar to those in the case of a fall in the number of
workers; y and N enter in the same way in most PAYGO systems. One im-
portant diﬀerence, however, is that individual workers are now directly ex-
posedtoreducedearnings.Thisholdsregardlessofwhetherthefallinearn-
ings is the result of lower wages, wj, or of shorter hours of work, hj (for
instance, via work sharing).
Both a ﬁxed-fee system and a ﬁxed income-ratio system incorporate (au-
tomatic) risk-sharing devices between workers and pensioners in the case
28 Assar Lindbeck10. Merton (1983) was a pioneer in showing that PAYGO pension systems may pool labor
and capital income risks between the young and the old.
11. If treated in the same way, immigrants would be entitled to a domestic pension under
three of the generic pension schemes listed: ﬁxed-fee, lump-sum beneﬁt, and ﬁxed income-
ratio systems. In ﬁxed-fee systems, domestic pensioners would have to accept a fall in their
of shocks in wages and hours of work, as opposed to the earlier-discussed
case of a change in the number of workers.10 In ﬁxed-fee systems, a fall in
workers’ average disposable income by y(1  t) is accompanied by a fall
in the average pension by ty(Nt/Rt). Thus, income risk is shared between
pensioners and workers in the proportion [t/(1 – t)] (Nt/Rt). In the case
of a ﬁxed income-ratio system, a fall in average labor income is shared
between representative agents in the two groups in the proportion 
.T h e
consequences for macroeconomic balance are quite complex and depend
partly on whether the fall in the real wage is related to a drop in productiv-
ity (and hence of output), or to a redistribution of income between labor
and capital.
Again, the consequences are more complicated in an actuarially fair
system. Because there is no direct impact on pensioners, individual work-
ers must bear the entire direct burden of a fall in real wages. Meanwhile,
the reduction in wage rates implies that workers have fewer resources avail-
able to buy unloaded assets from pensioners. Thus, asset prices may de-
cline in this case as well, thereby reducing pensioners’ resources for con-
sumption—with the earlier reservation in the case of a small open
economy with perfect capital mobility, or with rational expectations. If so,
some of the wage risk for workers is translated into asset risk for pension-
ers. As in the case of PAYGO systems, it is a complicated matter to deter-
mine the consequences for macroeconomic balance and inﬂation.
The slowdown in real-wage growth from the mid-1970s in most devel-
oped countries may very well be reversed in the future, for instance, as a
consequence of the emerging information and communications technology
(ICT) revolution. This would strengthen the ﬁnancial viability of existing
PAYGO pension systems. However, the ratio between pensions and the
wages of coexistent workers would then fall in the context of lump-sum
beneﬁt, earnings-based, contribution-based, and actuarially fair pension
systems—with the possibility of distributional conﬂicts as a result.
1.2.3 Increased Number of Pensioners
Recent and predicted future increases in the number of retirees is a third
important factor behind today’s concern about pension systems. The con-
sequences depend on how this change comes about, for instance, via immi-
gration of elderly people, the aging of a particularly large cohort (such as
the baby boomers), early retirement, or higher longevity after retirement.
In the ﬁrst case—immigration of elderly individuals—the crucial issue
is how immigrants are treated relative to native-born citizens.11 The conse-
Pensions and Contemporary Socioeconomic Change 29per capita pension by the factor Nt1/Rt, whereas in lump-sum beneﬁt and ﬁxed intertemporal
income-ratio pension systems, payroll taxes would have to be raised by that factor. Thus,
there are no automatic mechanisms for risk sharing between workers and pensioners in any
of these systems when the number of pensioners increases due to the immigration of elderly
people. Problems of macroeconomic balance will not arise as long as the marginal propensity
to consume is the same for all groups concerned. Income ﬂows in the context of other pension
systems—earnings-based, contribution-based, and actuarially fair—would be unaﬀected.
Under these three systems, elderly immigrants would (in the real world) be ﬁnanced either
by relatives or by social welfare payments. The latter, of course, would require a general
tax increase.
quences are more clear-cut if the number of retired individuals increases
as the result of the aging of a particularly large cohort, which may be
described as a parallel increase in Nt–1 and Rt with Nt unchanged. In ﬁxed-
fee systems, per capita pensions will fall in proportion to the rise in Rt
(equation [1]), whereas contribution rates would have to be raised in the
same proportion in lump-sum beneﬁt, earning-based, contribution-based,
and ﬁxed income-ratio systems (equations [4], [6], and [8]). Again, there is
no automatic risk-sharing mechanism. Assuming no diﬀerences in mar-
ginal propensities to consume, problems of macroeconomic balance would
not be induced (except for labor supply eﬀects of higher marginal tax
rates).
If a rise in the number of pensioners is instead caused by an increase in
the frequency of early retirement, the outcome would be a simultaneous
rise in Rt and a fall in Nt. In reality, this type of change is often induced
by the incentive structure of the pension system itself, including generous
rules for early retirement. In the context of a ﬁxed-fee system, pensions
would have to be reduced in proportion to the fall in the ratio Nt/Rt, while
in lump-sum beneﬁt, earnings-based, contribution-based, and ﬁxed inter-
generational income-ratio systems, the tax rate would have to be raised in
proportion to the rise in the ratio Rt/Nt.
In the context of an actuarially fair pension system, there will be no
direct impact on the income ﬂows. When a large number of pensioners sell
assets to workers, however, the former may face falling asset prices in the
same way as in the case of a reduced number of workers. This would imply
that pensioners will be hit indirectly in fully funded systems as well—ex-
cept with fully rational expectations or in a small open economy with fully
internationalized capital markets.
The situation becomes more complicated if the number of pensioners
instead increases because of greater longevity after retirement, so that Rt
increases relative to both Nt1 and Nt. In ﬁxed-fee systems, pensioners
would have to accept a reduction in yearly pensions in proportion to
higher longevity. More precisely, there will be a reduction in yearly pen-
sions by the change in the factor Nt–1/Rt. By contrast, under lump-sum
beneﬁt, earnings-based, contribution-based, and ﬁxed intergenerational
income-ratio systems, t would have to be raised in proportion to the in-
crease in the ratio Rt/Nt, provided that each pensioner is guaranteed the
30 Assar Lindbecksame annual pension as before. Again, there is no risk sharing between
generations.
In principle, the situation is the same in the case of an actuarially fair
system as in a ﬁxed-fee system, if information about longevity is obtained
exactly when a ﬁxed annuity is determined (at the time of retirement); the
annuity must be reduced in proportion to greater longevity. However, if
such information is not obtained until after the annuity has been deter-
mined, the pension provider must cover the higher costs, while the annual
income of pensioners is unchanged. In reality, however, information about
higher (expected) longevity is usually available before retirement, during
the course of working life. The insurance provider is then able to propose
higher contributions, and workers are likely to accept such proposals. It
has been argued that similar adjustments are diﬃcult to achieve under
PAYGO systems, because the link between what an individual pays and
what he or she receives later on is usually rather weak. Because the fee in
such a system functions as a tax wedge, higher fees may also be resisted by
those who are anxious to avoid additional work distortions (Persson 1998).
1.2.4 Lower Real Interest Rates
The rise in real interest rates in recent decades, as compared to the 1950s
and 1960s, is an important factor behind the increased popularity of actu-
arially fair, fully funded systems. Having already discussed shocks that
create problems mainly for PAYGO systems, I now examine an interest
shock that creates problems for actuarially fair, fully funded systems (i.e.,
a fall in real interest rates). A fall that takes place after retirement will
either create ﬁnancial diﬃculties for the pension provider (if the annuity
is ﬁxed) or force retirees to accept lower pensions (if the annuity is variable
in the sense that it is gradually adjusted to realized asset returns also after
retirement). In the ﬁrst case, pension providers may try to shift the conse-
quences of interest rate shock onto subsequent cohorts of pensioners.
At the individual-pensioner level, an obvious diﬀerence between a ﬁxed
and a variable annuity is that in the latter case the individual must accept
higher income risk during the period of retirement. The reason, of course,
is that with a variable annuity, the drawing down of previously accumu-
lated pension capital takes place only gradually during the retirement pe-
riod. The advantage to the individual is that he or she then has a further
opportunity to enjoy the return on assets, such as shares, after having re-
tired. A variable annuity also fulﬁlls the role of reducing ﬂuctuations in
the relation (ratio) between replacement rates for consecutive cohorts of
pensioners, because the capital value of the annuity will depend less on
the prevailing ﬁnancial-market situation at the time of retirement. This
gives rise to a genuine trade-oﬀ problem. Although a ﬁxed annuity pro-
vides greater income insurance in connection with uncertainty about lon-
gevity, a variable annuity furnishes relative income insurance in connection
with uncertainty about asset prices at the time of retirement. The individ-
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years before retirement, or for a gradual shift (also before retirement) to
less risky assets. This means, however, that the individual would miss out
on the opportunity to enjoy the return on high-yielding assets after retire-
ment on the basis of accumulated pension capital.
So far I have considered changes in real interest rates only at or after
retirement. If real interest rates fell during the individual’s working life and
were expected to remain low for quite a while, he or she would probably
agree to pay higher yearly contributions to a fully funded system in order
to boost the future pension.
Even though there are no direct eﬀects (as long as there are no buﬀer
funds), PAYGO pension systems are not immune to changes in real interest
rates. Both contribution rates and pension beneﬁts may be inﬂuenced indi-
rectly (general equilibrium eﬀects). The most obvious indirect eﬀect is that
lower (higher) real interest rates would increase (decrease) future real wage
rates by boosting (retarding) the real capital stock. However, it is also im-
portant to consider changes in factor prices that are induced by the pen-
sion system itself, an issue to be dealt with in subsequent sections.
1.3 Marginal Reforms
1.3.1 Ad Hoc Adjustment
Under all the stylized pension systems discussed earlier, well-speciﬁed
rules guarantee budget balance—intertemporal balance in fully funded
systems and balance in PAYGO systems, in the latter case via adjustments
in either fees or pensions. In reality, however, adjustments in conformity
with such rules often require explicit political decisions in the case of
PAYGO systems. As a result, such adjustment may take considerable time,
partly because of conﬂicts about the distribution of income. In the mean-
time, ﬁnancial imbalances of a PAYGO pension system easily emerge after
exogenous shocks. This is likely to initiate demand for ad hoc changes in
contributions or beneﬁts (i.e., changes outside the original rule system). In
extreme cases, a PAYGO pension system may even break down, in the
sense that large and rising deﬁcits ﬁnally necessitate abrupt, unplanned
cancellations of earlier promised entitlements.
For example, after a fall in the number of workers (N) or in average real
earnings (y), workers may resist higher fees in lump-sum beneﬁt, earnings-
based, and contribution-based systems, and in ﬁxed income-ratio systems
after a fall in the number of workers. It is therefore tempting to speculate
that workers may want to force contemporary pensioners to share the bur-
den of adjustment in such cases. Indeed, doubts are often expressed in the
political debate as to whether a majority of voters will grant promised pen-
sion entitlements to the elderly after such disturbances. If explicit changes
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feasible, obvious alternatives are higher taxes on pension income or partial
punctuation of price indexation of pensions—illustrations of the role of
“framing” in politics.
Because pensioners constitute only a minority among voters, it is per-
haps less likely that workers could be forced to share the burden of adjust-
ment (via an increase in ) when the burden would otherwise fall on pen-
sioners. (This occurs, for example, in the case of a fall in the number of
workers in ﬁxed-fee systems and in the case of reduced real interest rates
in actuarially fair systems, unless a ﬁxed annuity has been set.) Policy ac-
tions for this purpose may be released, however, if pensioners are an im-
portant swing group in the political arena, and if their voting behavior is
particularly sensitive to the pension beneﬁts oﬀered. Pensioners may also
ﬁnd political support for their position among workers close to retirement.
Even though the beneﬁts of contemporary pensioners have recently
been cut to a considerable extent in some countries, and fees have been
raised for workers, empirical evidence suggests that political authorities
have mainly opted for a “third alternative”: cuts in pensions for future pen-
sioners (McHale 1999). As an explanation, McHale has hypothesized that
today’s workers are afraid of becoming exposed to even greater cuts in
their own pensions in the future unless they agree to some cuts immedi-
ately. Another explanation, however, could be that the political price is
higher if the government cuts current disposable income by means of
higher fees or lower pensions today, than if it decides to reduce pensions
far into the future. After all, myopic behavior is not unheard of; indeed,
reference to such behavior (often interpreted as time inconsistency) is one
of the most common arguments for having compulsory pension systems in
the ﬁrst place.
When a pension system encounters problems because of a fall in the
number of individuals of working age relative to the number of individuals
above retirement age (the ratio Nt/Rt), immigration of young workers may
be a solution. This presupposes, of course, that such immigration is not
expected to result in serious tensions and conﬂicts in society.
1.3.2 Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms
To introduce new types of automatic adjustment mechanisms within
existing pension systems is an alternative to ad hoc policy interventions for
dealing with the distributional consequences of exogenous socioeconomic
shocks. One way of achieving this consists of shifting to a ﬁxed income-
ratio system (system 6 in the classiﬁcation above). However, such a reform
cannot be combined with ambitions to maintain strong quasi-actuarial ele-
ments in the pension system, which exist in contribution-based systems
with individual accounts (system 5 in the classiﬁcation above). However,
it would still be possible to make relative pensions among individual pen-
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butions; thus, some relative quasi-actuarial element could still be achieved.
We may also want to modify redistributions of income among genera-
tions in the case of unexpected increases in longevity after retirement.
Under lump-sum beneﬁt, earnings-based, and contribution-based systems
(i.e., systems 3–5), a technically simple way of avoiding placement of the
entire burden of adjustment on wage earners is an automatic rule that
makes annual pensions a declining function of remaining life expectancy
after retirement. For example, when pension annuities in the new NDC-
pension system in Sweden are determined, pension beneﬁts will be in-
versely proportional to expected longevity after retirement. However, this
means the entire burden of adjustment will be borne by the retirees—
hardly a risk-sharing device, which has made Diamond (2001) question
the wisdom of this element in the Swedish pension reform.12
Setting higher ages for both regular and earliest possible retirement is a
natural response to a rise in the number of retirees as a result of improved
health for individuals above today’s retirement age. In terms of the nota-
tions above, the budget balance of the pension system then would be im-
proved by a combination of higher Nt and lower Rt. (It may then also
be important to implement stricter rules for disability and unemployment
insurance, because these systems have in fact been used as alternative
routes to early retirement even by individuals without serious health prob-
lems.13) Increased downward ﬂexibility of relative wages for the elderly, as
with a less steep age-wage proﬁle, is one way to avoid sending a large
fraction of the elderly toward unemployment if the retirement age were
raised considerably. An alternative would be to reduce payroll taxes for
the elderly. In most countries, union and government wage policies may
be obstacles to both these solutions.
Because both health quality and preferences for work vary considerably
among the elderly, one no doubt could make a strong case for a ﬂexible
retirement age. To avoid distorting work incentives, however, and to keep
pension systems ﬁnancially viable, there are also good arguments for com-
bining such ﬂexibility with actuarially fair adjustments of pensions under
conditions of early retirement. Elderly individuals with health problems
could then be referred to the sick-insurance system. It is curious that the
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12. The new pension system in Sweden, however, does not include any automatic adjust-
ment mechanisms if the remaining life expectancy of individuals of a given age rises during
their retirement period. Such costs have to be covered by ad hoc adjustments via the braking
mechanism mentioned in the text.
13. There are limits, of course, to what can be achieved by such a reform. Given current
fees and beneﬁt rules, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has calculated that the statutory retirement age would have to be raised, within a
few decades, to no less than seventy-three to seventy-four years in many developed countries
to keep pension systems ﬁnancially viable. See Thomson (1998, 48, note 10) and OECD
(1988).14. Assume that an individual starts working at the age of twenty, retires at sixty-four, and
lives for another twenty years thereafter. On average, a worker pays his or her contribution
at age forty-two, and receives his or her pension at age seventy-four. Thus, as an approxima-
tion, we may say that thirty-two years (74  42) elapse between the payment of the contribu-
tion and the enjoyment of the beneﬁt. Let the contribution rate () be 20 percent, so that if
designs of today’s pension systems and labor market arrangements appear
to turn higher longevity and better health among the elderly into serious
social problems rather than into blessings. Such designs are hardly ex-
amples of good “social engineering.”
A more crude way of making a pension system ﬁnancially viable via
automatic adjustment mechanisms, regardless of the type of disturbance,
would be automatic reductions in beneﬁts or increases in fees in response
to an emerging or anticipated deﬁcit in the pension budget.
1.4 Radical Reforms
1.4.1 Shifting to a Quasi-actuarial System (NDC System)
Lump-sum beneﬁt systems and earnings-based systems (pension sys-
tems nos. 3 and 4) have served as the most common pension schemes
during the second half of the twentieth century. Although the former are
completely nonactuarial, there is some indirectly positive link between an
individual’s earlier contributions and his or her pension in earnings-based
systems. The link is very weak in most countries, however, because pen-
sions are often calculated on the basis of earnings during a limited number
of years of work. It is not technically diﬃcult to strengthen the link be-
tween beneﬁts and previously paid contributions (also without prefund-
ing). One obvious technique would be to increase the number of earning
years used as a basis for the size of an individual’s pensions.
The most straightforward way, however, would be to shift to a notional
deﬁned contribution (NDC) system with individual accounts (a pension
system of type 5 with the average and marginal return 	Gt for the in-
dividual when Rt  Nt–1 and t  t–1). Buchanan (1968) may have made the
ﬁrst proposal along these lines. A basic argument for this reform involves
reducing the implicit marginal tax wedge on work, hence raising the return
on work. Because economic eﬃciency will then increase in the labor mar-
ket, a Pareto improvement is possible in principle. There would also be
less risk of undermining the ﬁnancial viability of the pension system via
an induced reduction in the number of employed workers (N) or a reduc-
tion in earnings per worker (y) due to a fall in hours of work or labor
productivity. Under realistic assumptions, about 40 percent of the tax
wedge implicit in the pension system may be removed by a shift from a
completely nonactuarial to a quasi-actuarial, contribution-based pension
system with individual accounts.14 A prerequisite for favorable eﬀects on
Pensions and Contemporary Socioeconomic Change 35an individual earns $500 more (due to more hours of work or higher work intensity), he or
she pays $100 in pension contributions. In a quasi-actuarial PAYGO system in which the
return is 2 percent (the growth of the tax base), this contribution will be worth $188 after
thirty-two years. If the real rate of return in ﬁnancial markets is 5 percent and this is used
as a discount rate, the capital value of the $188 at average working age is $40 (188/[1.05]32).
This means that the marginal tax wedge on work is 12 percent ([100  40]/500). Thus, a shift
from a completely nonactuarial to a quasi-actuarial system will reduce the tax wedge from
20 percent to 12 percent in this case. See Lindbeck and Persson (2000, 7). The marginal tax
wedge would disappear in an actuarially fair system only if such a system were introduced
from scratch, and thus without the need to honor pension claims of previous PAYGO pen-
sioners. However, the mandatory nature of such a system may, by itself, distort individual
behavior if borrowing is constrained in the capital market.
15. Moreover, for a given tax rate , it can be shown that the welfare gain of the increased
eﬃciency of work would wind up entirely with the older generation. If the objective is to let
all generations enjoy a welfare gain, however, the pension fee may be reduced (Hassler and
Lindbeck 1997).
work incentives, of course, is that an individual understands the connec-
tion between his or her own contributions (payroll taxes) and the subse-
quent pension beneﬁts.
It is virtually impossible, however, to create a fully actuarially fair
PAYGO system (i.e., a system without tax wedges) in a dynamically eﬃ-
cient economy (i.e., an economy in which the real interest rate is higher
than the growth rate). If a PAYGO pension system would pay a higher
return than the growth rate of the tax base, the system would wind up with
an ever-rising deﬁcit. In a dynamically ineﬃcient economy, by contrast, it
can be shown that an actuarially fair PAYGO system would automatically
accumulate a fund of the same size as in a fully funded system (Hassler
and Lindbeck 1997). However, there is then no point in choosing an actu-
arially fair system in the ﬁrst place because the return on paid contribu-
tions would be higher in a traditional PAYGO system, in which it is equal
to the growth rate of aggregate earnings.
Is it possible, or even desirable, to make a PAYGO system actuarially
fair only on the margin, while maintaining a balanced budget by setting
the average return equal to the growth rate of the economy? Intuition sug-
gests that eﬃciency would be improved if the marginal return on pensions
were set in such a way that the individual’s marginal work decisions are
indiﬀerent between paying pension fees and investing on the capital mar-
ket. The point would be that many economic distortions are associated
with marginal rather than average tax wedges. It turns out to be techni-
cally possible to create such a system (Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ 1987; Hass-
ler and Lindbeck 1997); owing to intragenerational distributional con-
siderations, however, such a system is politically diﬃcult to implement,
because it requires a lump-sum tax (a “poll tax”) in order to balance the
pension budget.15
The ﬁnancial viability of a PAYGO pension system, of course, requires
that pensions are tied to the growth rate of aggregate earnings, hence the
product ytNt, rather than to the growth rate of average earnings, yt. When
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return on paid contributions equal to the rate of growth of average wage
earnings, the system threatened to be unstable in the case of slow employ-
ment growth. It was therefore necessary to introduce a braking mechanism
on pension beneﬁts that will be automatically released in the case of slower
employment growth.
1.4.2 Shifting to an Actuarially Fair, Fully Funded System
I have pointed out the eﬃciency gain of shifting from a PAYGO pension
system with a weak (or nonexistent) link between contributions and bene-
ﬁts for the individual to a PAYGO system with a stronger link, for instance
a quasi-actuarial system with individual accounts (system no. 5). A similar
eﬃciency gain may, of course, be achieved by a shift to a fully funded pen-
sion system (system no. 2), because the marginal tax wedge falls in this case
as well.
Yet, what is the gain, if any, of a shift from a quasi-actuarial pension
system (with a strong link between contributions and beneﬁts) to a fully
funded system with a market rate of return? Neglecting (to begin with)
conceivable behavior adjustments of individuals, it is easy to show that the
capital value of the gross income gain for individuals participating in the
pension system is the same as the implicit debt to the PAYGO pensioners.
Thus, there is no aggregate income gain of such a shift because someone
must serve this implicit debt (Feldstein 1995; Sinn 1999). Starting out with
a quasi-actuarial pension system, a shift to a fully funded system will not
result in a Pareto improvement in the labor market—assuming no distor-
tion of the capital stock to begin with (Kotlikoﬀ 1998; Fenge 1995; Lind-
beck and Persson 2000). This conclusion assumes that all income streams
are discounted by the market interest rate (which is not completely self-
evident, because we compare incomes of diﬀerent generations rather than
incomes during diﬀerent periods for a given individual).
There will, of course, be redistributions among generations. The signs
and sizes of these redistributions depend crucially on how the claims of
the old PAYGO pensioners are met. If the PAYGO pensioners are bailed
out by taxes on a transitional generation, that generation will experience
a sizeable income loss, whereas subsequent generations will experience in-
come gains as compared to the alternative of retaining the PAYGO system.
Our attitudes to such redistributions among generations, of course, depend
on how we evaluate (i.e., discount) income of diﬀerent generations. One
argument for enforcing a redistribution to future generations may be that
the previous introduction of the PAYGO pension system most likely re-
duced aggregate saving, and hence, the aggregate capital stock, to the dis-
advantage of future generations. Metaphorically speaking, because the
grandparents of today’s children originally received a gift at the expense
of future generations, the grandchildren may ask their parents’ generation
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saving. Because lump-sum taxes hardly are politically feasible, a transition
generation would also be exposed to higher marginal taxes, with lower
economic eﬃciency of work as result. Subsequent generations would in-
stead be able to enjoy smaller marginal tax wedges, with increased work
eﬃciency as a consequence.
All this may give the impression that the issue of shifting from a quasi-
actuarial PAYGO system to an actuarially fair, fully funded pension sys-
tem is a problem only of intergenerational distribution of income (wealth),
and of a trade-oﬀ between work incentives and aggregate saving among
diﬀerent generations. There is more to it than that, however.
First, in most countries, existing capital-income taxation distorts aggre-
gate national saving and investment. This is another reason—distinct from
the one that the gift to the ﬁrst generation of PAYGO pensioners has re-
duced aggregate saving—that the capital stock is likely to be lower than it
would have been otherwise. As a result, the discount rate (regardless of
whether this is the market interest rate or the subjective discount rate) may
be lower than the return on capital assets, a point made by Feldstein
(1996). A shift to a fully funded pensions system, like a reduction in gov-
ernment debt, could then be regarded as a second-best policy designed to
increase the distorted stock of aggregate wealth, including real capital as-
sets, in society.16
Second, we also must look at the risk-return combination of alternative
pension systems. Normally, the returns on PAYGO pension claims are not
fully correlated with the returns on claims in an actuarially fair pension
systems. For one thing, the growth rate of the tax base of a PAYGO system
(i.e., aggregate earnings) and the return on ﬁnancial markets are not fully
correlated, particularly when pension funds hold foreign assets. The politi-
cal risk is also likely to diﬀer. (It is often assumed that claims on funded
systems with individual accounts provide stronger property rights than do
pension claims in PAYGO systems.) What all this boils down to is that a
combination of a PAYGO and a fully funded system provides a richer
portfolio of pension assets than either of these pension systems in isola-
tion. This is an additional rationale for a partial shift to a fully funded
system.
The most problematic aspect of any shift to a compulsory, fully funded
pension system is, in my view, how to minimize the risks that such a reform
will—sooner or later—result in politicization of the domestic economy.
There is a serious risk that future politicians will use government-
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16. However, in some countries, including a number of European countries, this negative
eﬀect on the aggregate capital stock may have been compensated for by various types of
investment subsidies, although these may have distorted the allocation of investment.controlled pension funds to allocate ﬁnancial funds to politically correct
industries and to those parts of the national economy where it is particu-
larly tempting to buy votes. Politicians, or their subordinates, might also
start using voting rights in ﬁrms to exert inﬂuence within ﬁrms, even
though they may lack knowledge as to how ﬁrms should be run. Thus, the
case against nationalizing pension capital is the same as the arguments
against the Lange-Lerner proposal of market socialism.
Technically, it is possible to design institutions that isolate government-
operated pension funds from political pressure, including party politics.
The most obvious method is perhaps to require such funds to invest only
in index funds, possibly global ones, and to give the managers of the funds
instructions to exercise the voting rights in ﬁrms. Future politicians anx-
ious to exercise economic power, however, are free to change such rules. It
is much easier politically to change the rules of portfolio allocation and
corporate governance in existing government-operated funds than to pro-
pose outright nationalization of an economy from scratch. Thus, those
who are critical of market socialism have good reasons to be critical of
government-operated pension funds as well. After all, proposals of mar-
ket socialism also incorporate stringent rules instructing managers of
government-owned ﬁrms to behave like proﬁt miximizers under perfect
competition. Clearly, it is naive to believe that politicians, who choose
their profession to exert power, would accept such rules.
The most promising way to mitigate the risks for politicization of the
national economy is probably to make pension funds privately owned and
operated from the outset, and to allow individuals to choose fund manag-
ers. The higher administrative costs of decentralized (versus centralized)
fund management is the price of limiting the risk of politicizing the na-
tional economy. There are also devices to limit these administrative costs,
such as caps on fees, which would induce some managers of mandatory
pension funds to choose index funds.
1.5 Adjustment to Increased Heterogeneity
Real-world pension systems have always, at least to some extent,
granted (or exploited) the heterogeneity of the population. An obvious
example is the overcompensation of early cohorts when PAYGO systems
were introduced to bring about a rapid increase in living standards for the
elderly or to create broad political support for the reform. This overcom-
pensation was extended to a great number of cohorts by a gradual increase
in the contribution rate (a rise in the ratio t/t–1).
An example of overcompensation within cohorts is redistribution in fa-
vor of low-income groups via either a basic (lump-sum) pension or a guar-
anteed pension with means testing on pension beneﬁts. In most earnings-
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earnings during a limited number of years of work), females are also fa-
v o r e db e c a u s eo ff e w e ry e a r so fw o r ka n dal a r g e rn u m b e ro fy e a r sa f t e r
retirement. However, there are also well-known regressive redistributional
elements in most real-world pension systems, although it is diﬃcult to say
whether these eﬀects are intentional. One example is redistribution in favor
of the individual with a steep income proﬁle over his or her life cycle (when
the pension level is tied to earnings late in the individual’s working life).
Another example is redistribution to individuals with high expected lon-
gevity (in systems with ﬁxed annuities). In both cases, the arrangements
tend to favor highly educated individuals with relatively high lifetime in-
come (wealth).
In recent decades, it is only natural that new types of heterogeneity in
the population have given rise to proposals for pension reforms. An obvi-
ous example is increased instability of the typical family structure. Pension
systems established in the early twentieth century were careful to provide
support for widows and their children because the death of the (usually
male) income provider was a major factor in the breakup of families. A
strong trend toward the labor-force participation of married women has
reduced the need for special pension claims for widows. It does not seem
reasonable that widows should receive pensions based on both their own
previous incomes (or contributions) and widowhood. A delicate issue,
however, is what should be regarded a reasonable length of time to phase
out the latter type of pension claim, if politicians decide about such an
outphasing. The huge increase in part-time work, also largely a result of
increased labor force participation of women, also raises the issue of
whether the beneﬁt rules in contribution-based and earnings-based sys-
tems should favor or disfavor part-time work of diﬀerent durations.
Today, family instability is largely related to divorce and temporary co-
habitation outside marriage. One way of adjusting pension systems to this
new situation would be to give couples property rights on one another’s
pension capital, in the same way that the law stipulates such property
rights for spouses regarding real estate and ﬁnancial assets. Such arrange-
ments may also solve the problem of pensions for survivors (including wid-
ows). After all, pension capital usually accumulates gradually over the
working life of the family in a manner similar to that of other assets. A
delicate issue here concerns how other forms of cohabitation than mar-
riage should be treated.
The heterogeneity of the population has also increased as a result of
changes in the traditional life cycle, characterized by the linear sequence
of education-work-retirement. This sequence is currently being replaced
by more complex and individually varied life cycles. The continuity of
working life is often interrupted by education, retraining, periods of work
40 Assar Lindbeck17. An early proposal along these lines is Rehm (1961). More elaborate plans have been
developed by Fo ¨lster (1999) and Orzag and Snower (1999).
at home (e.g., caring for children) and prolonged periods of leisure. This is
an important background for contemporary proposals to replace existing
welfare-state arrangements with compulsory saving accounts (possibly
negative accounts early in life) and related drawing rights on claims accu-
mulated before retirement.17 Proposals of compulsory saving with drawing
rights are based on the assumption that individuals can handle modest
economic setbacks on their own by drawing on accumulated compulsory
saving, for instance, in connection with short periods of unemployment or
health problems. However, people would be obligated to reserve a certain
minimum balance in their accounts for old age. Thus, proposals of this
type may be seen as eﬀorts to encourage individuals to take greater respon-
sibility for their own income protection in the event of moderate strains
on their economic situations. Of course, when having to deal with major
income losses, the system of drawing rights must be combined with insur-
ance; this point is also granted in most proposals. Another basic idea be-
hind the scheme of drawing rights is to provide the individual with in-
creased resources to shift among work, education, and leisure over the life
cycle. Work incentives would then also be improved (via smaller tax
wedges) and problems of moral hazard mitigated—two major problems
of today’s social insurance systems (evidenced by moral hazard in connec-
tion with unemployment, sick leave, and early retirement insurances).
It is also a commonplace that higher international labor mobility creates
diﬃculties in assigning individuals to national pension systems. It will cer-
tainly become necessary to adjust pension rules in the future to deal with
this issue and, in particular, to decide whether pensions should be pro-
vided on the basis of an individual’s country of origin or of residence.
Without some coordination of national rules, individuals may in some
cases lose entitlements earned in one country, yet in other instances may
e n du pw i t hm o r ef a v o r a b l ep e n s i o n sb yl i v i n gp a r to ft h e i rl i v e si no n e
country and part in another. In the former case, the pension system would
impede international mobility of labor in the same way that nontransfer-
able occupational pensions among ﬁrms or sectors reduce domestic labor
mobility. In the latter case, international labor mobility may, in fact, be
subsidized. Shifts to quasi-actuarial or fully actuarial systems, or to com-
pulsory saving with individual accounts, would mitigate or even eliminate
such problems. Of course, ambitions to use pension systems as tools of
redistribution would then be reduced. Increased international ﬂexibility
of the choice of residence of individuals also creates an increased need to
unify the taxation principles for private pension policies, including occu-
pational pensions. In some countries, governments permit tax deductions
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for such insurance contributions while taxing subsequent pension beneﬁts,
whereas governments in other countries do the opposite, which clearly
distorts residence decisions.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
As we have seen, the consequences for pension systems of various types
of socioeconomic changes depend crucially on the detailed structure of the
pension system.18 For instance, there is no (direct) risk sharing in PAYGO
pension systems in response to variations in the number of workers or the
number of pensioners. By contrast, both a ﬁxed-fee and a ﬁxed income-
ratio system incorporate automatic risk-sharing devices between workers
and pensioners in the event of shocks in wages and hours of work. Al-
though there is no direct risk sharing in the case of socioeconomic shocks
in fully funded systems, I have argued that indirect eﬀects of diﬀerent types
may create some risk sharing.
It is clear that several weaknesses of current PAYGO systems can be
solved within the framework of existing systems. For instance, problems
concerning ﬁnancial vulnerability and unexpected redistribution may be
mitigated by ad hoc increases in fees, cuts in beneﬁts (often by way of less-
favorable price indexing), or increased retirement age. At the same time,
such interventions highlight the political risks inherent in government-
operated pension systems.
If more-automatic risk sharing between generations is desired, an obvi-
ous reform is to shift to what have in this chapter been called ﬁxed income-
ratio systems, in which the relation between pensions and the earnings of
contemporary workers is ﬁxed. The consequences of increased instability
of the family can also be alleviated, for instance, by legislation requiring
spouses to share one another’s pension claims. If enhanced work incentives
were called for instead, then the actuarial elements of the PAYGO system
could be extended by strengthening the link between contributions and
beneﬁts for each individual, possibly by shifting to what have here been
called quasi-actuarial systems. In the context of such a system, it is also
technically easy to have a ﬂexible retirement age without individuals’ being
able to shift the costs of early retirement upon others. I have also men-
tioned that compulsory saving accounts with individual drawing rights,
combined with compulsory insurance systems, provide an interesting re-
sponse to increased heterogeneity among individuals and to demands for
placing greater responsibility on the individual for his or her own eco-
nomic security.
The most obvious argument for a shift to an actuarially fair, fully funded
42 Assar Lindbeckpension system is perhaps to favor future generations at the expense of
currently working generations—if such a redistribution is regarded ethi-
cally fair. One speciﬁc twist of this argument is to expand the capital stock
in order to compensate either for reduced national saving when the
PAYGO system was introduced or for distortions of saving and investment
decisions via the existing capital-income tax system. If we start from a
PAYGO system with a weak (or nonexistent) marginal link between contri-
butions and beneﬁts for individuals, a shift to a fully funded system will
also result in an eﬃciency gain via smaller marginal tax wedges, in the
same way as when such a PAYGO system is replaced with a quasi-actuarial
system. However, it should be noted that a shift from a quasi-actuarial
system to an actuarially fair system does not reduce the marginal tax
wedge for any generation without raising it for some other generations.
The reason is that a removal of an earlier existing PAYGO system must in
reality be ﬁnanced by distortionary taxes (Lindbeck and Persson 2000).
However, there is also a portfolio diversiﬁcation argument for a partial
shift to a fully funded pension system. The reason is that the returns on
pension claims are not completely correlated among pension systems. A
partial shift would provide individuals with more well-balanced portfolios
of pension claim than would either a PAYGO or an actuarially fair system
alone. This is an important point in a world with diﬀerent types of market
risks (risk in earnings versus risk in returns on capital markets) and diﬀer-
ent types of political risks (such as diﬀerent strengths of property rights
among types of pension claims). The most severe problem inherent in ei-
ther a partial or complete shift to a fully funded system lies in ﬁnding ways
to avoid politicizing the domestic economy. The most promising way to
achieve this is probably to let pension funds be privately owned and oper-
ated from the outset, and to allow individuals to choose fund managers,
possibly combined with caps on the administrative fees to pension fund
managers.
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44 Assar LindbeckDiscussion Summary
Martin Feldstein shared the worry expressed in the paper that a centrally
managed, funded system would create problems of political interference.
He cited some evidence from the United States in which state governments
have pension systems for their workers and often have rules about in-
vesting the funds locally. He concluded that this could be avoided by hav-
ing a system of individual accounts. Rolf Langhammer suggested that in
making a relative assessment of the desirability of government versus pri-
vately operated pension funds, the probability of insolvency should also
be taken into consideration. He brought up the American Orange County
case, which shows that lower levels of state authority can also go bust.
A. Lans Bovenberg argued that Pareto improving transitions from pay-
as-you-go (PAYGO) to funded systems are possible and that everyone can
gain if there is a distortion in the economy. In Europe, more important
than the capital income tax already mentioned by Martin Feldstein would
be labor market distortions, and he suggested exploitation of this distor-
tion for eﬃciency gains. He conceded, however, that this is a diﬃcult task
because many of these distortions are connected with intragenerational
redistribution, which makes it much harder to come up with something
like a Pareto improvement. Bovenberg concluded that the key challenge is
to perform redistribution more eﬃciently. Eytan Sheshinski pointed out
that the extent to which a fully funded system eliminates distortions de-
pends on the details of the system with respect to provisions against idio-
syncratic risks, individual risks, or macro risks, and that every kind of
guarantee will involve some kind of distortion. He gave the example of
government guarantees in case of bankruptcy, which will have distortive
eﬀects on the portfolio choices of the managers. As further distortions,
which he suggested can be acceptable for distributional purposes, he men-
tioned mandatory pricing of annuities when there are diﬀerent risks—for
example, with respect to longevity.
Martin Feldstein argued that the potential gains from going beyond no-
tional deﬁned contributions to actually funded deﬁned contributions are
much greater than suggested in the paper, because diﬀerences in rates of
return prevail for more than one year. He cited the example in which a
deﬁned contribution system produces the rate of growth in the economy
of 2 percent and a funded system provides the real rate of return on capital
of 8 percent, and assumed that the contributions would be in the accounts
for an average of thirty years (put in at age forty-ﬁve in the middle of the
working life and withdrawn at age seventy-ﬁve in the middle of the retire-
ment life). In this case he calculated that the diﬀerence between a 2 percent
growth rate and an 8 percent growth rate would be a factor of 5 or 6
leading to an enormous implicit tax wedge if one was forced to take the
lower rate of return. Assar Lindbeck replied that there would eﬀectively be
Pensions and Contemporary Socioeconomic Change 45less return than 8 percent if there was a PAYGO system to begin with
because of ﬁnancing of the inherited PAYGO pensions. He pointed out
that in the case of starting from a PAYGO system, it is possible to gain
from a move toward a funded system only when the rate of return is higher
than the discount rate. Pierre Pestieau remarked that it is not clear that
there is a gain from the move toward the stock market, at least in a general
equilibrium framework, unless there are liquidity-constrained households.
The issue of risk sharing emphasized in the paper was stressed by A.
Lans Bovenberg, who argued that it is particularly important in the Euro-
pean context, because Europeans tend to be particularly risk averse, due
in part (as he suggests) to the fact that the less risk averse left the continent
and went to the United States. He argued that in order to diversify risk it
would be appropriate to combine various types of pension systems. Risk
sharing is also behind the problems with portability in funded systems,
according to Bovenberg, because in Europe funded plans tend to include
many intergenerational transfers—meaning that they are not purely
funded systems but contain, in a sense, elements of PAYGO systems. The
element of intergenerational risk sharing in many funded systems actually
enabled these systems to better exploit the equity premium, because they
did not need to be particularly risk averse, as an individual would be (espe-
cially when nearing retirement age). As the population generally appreci-
ates arrangements of this kind, it seems important to Bovenberg to look
for ways to maintain them in the face of increasing competitive pressures.
One of only a few available options would be to increase the use of the
capital market and take advantage of capital market integration to improve
risk diversiﬁcation. Another option could be to go to a pan-European sys-
tem, but he deemed this very diﬃcult as well because of huge transaction
costs. Assar Lindbeck endorsed the view that there is a strong case for a
mixed system because the systems are associated with diﬀerent risks that
are not completely correlated. Therefore, it would be possible to achieve
an improved portfolio. However, he warned that it might not be sensible
to set up a very small funded system because of high ﬁxed costs, and added
that it might have been unwise for Sweden to relegate only 2.5 percentage
points of the contributions to the fully funded system. With respect to the
equity premium, he noted that it is has proven very diﬃcult to explain it
by mere consideration of risk. To the extent that this premium is higher
than the compensation for risk, a fully funded system would give the entire
population the chance to enjoy this equity premium. He argued that the
possibility of investing on a voluntary basis was limited, given the high
level of taxes.
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ remarked that the prevailing notion that switching
to a funded system would be neutral when the government would borrow
money to pay for the funding and assess taxes to cover the interest over-
looks the facts that the European pension systems are simply not sustain-
46 Assar Lindbeckable, and that governments have only a few years left in which to make
adjustments to prevent a complete collapse of the systems. This is, he re-
ported, the conclusion of recent generational account exercises that sug-
gest that tax rates will have to be raised dramatically in the future, begin-
ning with tax rates that are already enormously high. He pointed out that
the situation is that of drastically disadvantaging future generations so as
to maintain the situation for current generations—the current elderly in
particular—and concluded that a reasonable position on the question of
whom to hurt is to share the harm across current and future generations.
He argued that it would be insuﬃcient to go to a notional account system
and slightly improve the incentive system, but that it is necessary to do
something major that addresses the intergenerational equity issue, and
suggested that this would occur through a move to a funded system.
Edward Palmer raised the issue of the risk of longevity and noted that
one advantage of notional account systems is that they put longevity into
the equation and increase the transparency of the system with respect to
the expected beneﬁts. He noted that in a notional or ﬁnancial-account
deﬁned contribution system it is clear that the worker bears the longevity
risk, whereas this is not the case in a deﬁned beneﬁt system.
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